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Abstract. In this paper we propose a simple, novel scheme for using a
mobile device to enhance CardSpace authentication. During the process
of user authentication on a PC using CardSpace, a random and short-
lived one-time password is sent to the user’s mobile device; this must
then be entered into the PC by the user when prompted. The scheme
does not require any changes to login servers, the CardSpace identity
selector, or to the mobile device itself. We specify the scheme and give
details of a proof-of-concept prototype. Security and operational analyses
are also provided.
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1 Introduction
In line with the continuing increase in the number of on-line services requir-
ing authentication, there has been a proportional rise in the number of digital
identities needed for authentication purposes. This has contributed to the re-
cent rapid growth in identity-oriented attacks, such as phishing, pharming, etc.
In an attempt to mitigate such attacks, Microsoft has introduced an identity
management system called CardSpace.
CardSpace is a user-friendly tool supporting user authentication. To sign on
to a website, a CardSpace user selects a virtual card, known as an information
card (InfoCard), from an interface provided by the CardSpace identity selec-
tor (CIdS), instead of providing a username and password.
One fundamental limitation of CardSpace is that anyone with access to a Win-
dows user account can also access and use the InfoCards. By default, CardSpace
does not provide access protection for the CIdS. To address this issue, CardSpace
allows individual InfoCards to be PIN-protected. Also, the entire Windows user
account could, of course, be password-protected. Whilst the use of passwords
and PINs for InfoCard protection can help, it does not completely solve the
problem, not least because one of the fundamental design goals of CardSpace is
to reduce reliance on password authentication.
We address this limitation through the introduction of a second authentication
factor to be used in conjunction with CardSpace authentication. This additional
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means of user authentication involves a one-time password (OTP) supplied to
the user by a standard mobile device capable of receiving SMS messages. Such
devices are ubiquitous, making the system almost universally applicable. The
system also provides two-factor authentication, the ﬁrst factor being possession
of the PC containing the InfoCard and the second factor being possession of
the appropriate mobile phone. Two factor authentication is typically considered
‘strong authentication’ [1].
The wide use of Windows, recent versions of which incorporate CardSpace,
means that any enhancement to CardSpace security is likely to be of signiﬁ-
cance for large numbers of identity management users and service providers. In
addition, the use of a mobile phone to enhance CardSpace-based authentication
is attractive since users are neither required to remember any new passwords
nor obliged to use any additional hardware. Furthermore, many RPs may not
accept the burden of supporting a second authentication factor (e.g. SMS-based
authentication), unless there is a signiﬁcant ﬁnancial incentive or if forced to do
so for legal or regulatory reasons. As a result, a client-side technique for support-
ing SMS authentication for CardSpace-enabled RPs could be practically useful.
Such a technique avoids any impact on the performance of the server, since the
additional overhead is handled by the client.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives an overview
of CardSpace, and section 3 presents the proposed scheme. In section 4 we dis-
cuss implementation issues, and in section 5 we provide a security analysis. In
section 6 we describe a prototype realisation, and section 7 highlights possible
areas for related work. Finally, section 8 concludes the paper.
2 CardSpace
2.1 Introduction
CardSpace provides a secure and consistent way for users to control and manage
personal data, to review personal data before sending it to a website, and to
verify the identity of visited websites. It enables websites to obtain data from
users, e.g. to support user authentication and authorisation.
Digital identities are represented to users as Information Cards (or InfoCards).
There are two types of InfoCards: personal (self-issued) cards, and managed
cards issued by remote IdPs. Personal cards are created by users themselves,
and the claims listed in such an InfoCard are asserted by the self-issued iden-
tity provider (SIP) that co-exists with the CardSpace identity selector (CIdS)
on the user machine. InfoCards, personal or managed, do not contain sensitive
information, but instead carry metadata indicating the types of personal data
associated with this identity, and from where assertions regarding this data can
be obtained. The data referred to by personal cards is stored on the user ma-
chine, whereas the data referred to by a managed card is held by the identity
provider (IdP) that issued it [2,3,4,5].
The proposed scheme can operate with both managed and personal cards.
However, in this paper we only describe its operation with personal cards because
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the security risks associated with such cards are much greater; any adversary who
has access to a logged-in Windows machine can use any of the personal cards
unless they are PIN-protected, which is not the default case. By contrast, use
of a managed card typically involves authentication by the issuing IdP. The use
of personal cards is described below; the use of managed cards is covered in the
relevant speciﬁcations [2,3,6,7].
By default, CardSpace is supported by Internet Explorer (IE) from version 7
onwards. Extensions to other browsers, such as Firefox1 and Safari2, also exist.
An updated version, CardSpace 2.0 Beta 2, was released, although Microsoft
announced in early 2011 that it will not ship; instead Microsoft has released
a technology preview of U-Prove3. In this paper we refer throughout to the
CardSpace version that is shipped by default as part of Windows Vista and
Windows 7, that is available as a free download for XP and Server 2003, and
which has been approved as an OASIS standard [7].
2.2 Personal Cards
The CIdS allows a user to create a personal card and populate its ﬁelds with
self-asserted claims. CardSpace restricts the contents of personal cards to non-
sensitive data. Prerequisites for use of a personal card include a CardSpace-
enabled relying party (RP) and a CardSpace-enabled user agent, e.g. a web
browser capable of invoking the CIdS. At the time that an InfoCard is created,
a card-speciﬁc ID and master key are also created and stored by the SIP (which
also stores the values of the claims for this card).
Using Personal Cards. When using personal cards, CardSpace adopts the
following protocol. We describe the protocol for the case where the RP does
not employ a security token service (STS), a software component responsible for
security policy and token management within an IdP and, optionally, within an
RP [6].
1. User agent → RP. HTTP/S request: GET (login page).
2. RP → user agent. HTTP/S response. A login page is returned containing
the CardSpace-enabling tags in which the RP security policy is embedded.
3. User → user agent. The RP web page oﬀers the option to use CardSpace;
selecting this option activates the CIdS, which is passed the RP security
policy. Note that if this is the ﬁrst time that this RP has been contacted,
the CIdS will display the identity of the RP and give the user the option to
either proceed or abort the protocol.
1 https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/
openinfocard-identity-selector/
2 http://www.hccp.org/safari-plug-in.html
3 http://blogs.msdn.com/b/card/archive/2011/02/15/
beyond-windows-cardspace.aspx
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4. CIdS→ InfoCards. The CIdS, after evaluating the RP security policy, high-
lights those InfoCards matching the policy and greys out the rest. InfoCards
previously used for this RP are displayed in the upper half of the selector
screen.
5. User → CIdS. The user chooses a personal card. (Alternatively, the user
could create and choose a new personal card). The user can preview the
card (with its associated claims) to ensure that they are willing to release
the claim values. Of the claims speciﬁed in an InfoCard, only those requested
in the RP policy will be passed to the requesting RP.
6. CIdS  SIP. The CIdS creates and sends a SAML-based Request Secu-
rity Token (RST) to the SIP, which responds with a SAML-based Request
Security Token Response (RSTR).
7. CIdS → user agent → RP. The RSTR is passed to the user agent, which
forwards it to the RP.
8. RP→ user agent. The RP validates the token, and, if satisﬁed, grants access.
Private Personal Identifiers (PPIDs). The PPID is an identiﬁer linking a
speciﬁc InfoCard to a particular RP [2]. When a user ﬁrst uses a personal card
at a particular RP, CardSpace generates a site-speciﬁc PPID by combining the
card ID with data taken from the RP certiﬁcate, and a site-speciﬁc signature key
pair by combining the card master key with data taken from the RP certiﬁcate.
In both cases, the domain name and/or IP address of the RP is used if no RP
certiﬁcate is available. After generation, the PPID and key pair are stored by
the SIP for use in future interactions with this RP.
Since the PPID and key pair are RP-speciﬁc, the PPID does not function as
a global user identiﬁer, helping to enhance user privacy and reduce the impact
of PPID compromise. The CIdS displays a shortened version of the PPID to
protect against social engineering attacks and improve readability.
When a user ﬁrst interacts with an RP using CardSpace, the RP retrieves
the PPID and the public key from the received SAML security token, and stores
them. If a personal InfoCard is re-used at a site, the supplied security token will
contain the same PPID and public key as used previously, and will be signed
using the corresponding private key. The RP compares the received PPID and
public key with its stored values, and veriﬁes the digital signature.
The PPID could be used on its own as a shared secret to authenticate a user
to an RP. However, it is recommended that the associated (public) signature
veriﬁcation key, as held by the RP, should always be used to verify the signed
security token to provide a more robust authentication method [2].
3 The Scheme
We next give an overview of the novel scheme, covering relevant operational
aspects.
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3.1 Entities Involved
The entities involved are:
– a CardSpace-enabled RP (with which the user must have an account);
– a CardSpace-enabled user agent (e.g. a suitable web browser such as IE);
– a handheld device capable of receiving SMS4 messages (e.g. a mobile phone);
and
– software installed on the user PC (referred to throughout as the ‘adaptor’)
implementing the scheme described below.
The adaptor could be implemented as a browser extension5, which must be able
to read, inspect and modify browser-rendered web pages, and must also be able
to intercept CardSpace-issued RSTR tokens. In addition, it must be able to
generate and send a random, short-lived OTP to the user’s mobile phone, and
provide a means for the user to enter the OTP. Prior to use of the protocol, the
browser extension must be installed and provided with the phone number of the
user’s mobile phone.
3.2 Operation
The system operates as follows; a summary of the protocol is shown in ﬁgures 1
and 2. Steps 1, 2, 4–7, and 10 are the same as steps 1, 2, 3–6, and 8, respectively,
of the CardSpace personal card protocol given in section 2.2.
3. Adaptor → user agent. The adaptor scans the login page to detect whether
the RP website supports CardSpace. If so, it proceeds; otherwise it termi-
nates.
8. Unlike in the ‘standard’ case, the RSTR does not reach the RP; instead the
adaptor performs the following steps.
(a) CIdS → adaptor: RSTR. The adaptor intercepts the RSTR and tem-
porarily stores it.
(b) Adaptor: generates OTP. The adaptor computes (and temporarily stores)
a random, short-lived OTP.
(c) Adaptor → mobile phone: OTP. The adaptor sends the OTP to the
user’s mobile phone in an SMS message, sent via an HTTPS-protected
connection to the SMS Centre or SMS gateway of a wireless carrier or
SMS service provider. This method is adopted because it does not require
a special application to be installed on the user’s mobile phone, which
4 SMS (Short Messaging Service) allows mobile phones to exchange short messages of
at most 160 Latin characters; this service is supported by all GSM and 3G handsets.
5 Note that if the adaptor is implemented as a browser extension, then the CardSpace-
enabled RP must not employ an STS. Instead, the RPmust express its security policy
using HTML/XHTML, and interactions between the CIdS and the RP must be based
on HTTP/S via a web browser (a simpler and probably more common scenario for
RP interactions). This is because a (JavaScript-based) browser extension is by itself
incapable of managing the necessary communications with an RP STS.
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Fig. 1. Summary of the Protocol
Fig. 2. Protocol exchanges
may not be possible in non-smart phones. In addition such an approach
has a better transmission rate than other methods such as Bluetooth or
infrared (see section 4.2).
9. User  user agent. The adaptor prompts the user to enter the OTP, and
the user reads it from the phone display6. The adaptor veriﬁes that the
entered OTP matches the one it just generated. The OTP must be entered
within a deﬁned interval, e.g. of 10 minutes, after its generation; otherwise
the adaptor will delete the RSTR and provide an error message to the user.
6 Note that if the mobile phone and/or the SIM card are PIN-protected, then the user
must first enter the correct PIN(s).
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4 Discussion
We now consider implementation issues, possible variants and potential advan-
tages of the scheme.
4.1 Implementation Issues
The length of the OTP must be carefully chosen to achieve an acceptable bal-
ance between security and usability. To maximise usability and avoid confusion,
we propose the use of a 4-character OTP made up of lower case letters and
digits (excluding 0, i, j and o). This gives a total of 324 possible OTPs (i.e. just
over a million), which is roughly 100 times the number of possible 4-digit PINs
commonly used for bank cards.
4.2 Variants of the Scheme
OTP Transmission. In the scheme described above, the OTP is sent from the
client to the mobile device in an SMS message. Whilst convenient, this has cost
implications and may also involve a delay of a few seconds. Possible alternatives
include sending it via Bluetooth, infrared or a USB/serial cable. Such approaches
have the advantage of avoiding the SMS messaging costs but require both devices
to support the relevant technologies. The main disadvantage of such approaches
is the need to install a special application on the phone; this will rule out non-
smart phones, and signiﬁcantly increase the complexity of setting up the scheme.
A further alternative would be to use a messaging service other than SMS
for the OTP transfer (e.g. instant messaging or email); like the use of the SMS
service, such an approach would avoid the need to install any new applications
on the phone.
OTP Entry. In the scheme as described above, the user manually enters the
OTP, which is potentially inconvenient and time-consuming (although the use
of a 4-digit PIN, as described in section 4.1, should minimise inconvenience).
An alternative would be to send the OTP back automatically, e.g. via an SMS
message sent to the SMS gateway, from where the adaptor could retrieve it.
Whilst convenient, such a process could be costly, since use of the SMS gateway
would incur additional messaging costs.
RSTR. As part of step 9 of section 3.2 the adaptor could create a new SAML
token containing the RSTR produced by the SIP and an additional SAML ﬁeld
indicating that the user has been authenticated using an SMS-transmitted OTP.
Of course, the RP would need to be modiﬁed to be able to process such a token,
although this would be straightforward. This authentication statement would
give the RP added assurance of user authenticity.
4.3 Advantages
Like other OTP-based authentication systems, the proposed scheme reduces ex-
posure to shoulder-surﬁng attacks and also helps to thwart key loggers.
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The scheme does not require users to remember new passwords for each new
account; this could reduce the risk of password re-use, writing passwords down
in insecure ways, and use of easily-guessable passwords.
In addition to strengthening user authentication, the scheme could also serve
as an intrusion detector. If the user receives an unexpected OTP, then it could
be deduced that there is a security breach.
Finally, the scheme operates transparently to external parties, and hence does
not require any changes to RPs or identity selectors.
5 Security Analysis
5.1 Threats to the Mobile Device
If an unprotected mobile phone or SIM is lost, stolen or borrowed, then it might
be possible to access an OTP from the SMS inbox. However, this will be of no
value without access to the corresponding PC (and the OTP will expire a short
time after generation). Moreover, a lost phone or SIM is likely to be reported by
its owner, causing the SIM to be deactivated, which means that the usefulness
of such a stolen device for impersonating a user will be very limited.
5.2 Threats to the Supporting Infrastructure
An attacker with temporary access to the PC but without the mobile phone
could attempt to intercept the OTP whilst it is being transmitted from the PC
to the phone. However, the communication link between the SMS gateway and
the PC is protected using HTTPS, and the connection between the visited mo-
bile network and the mobile phone is protected by the air interface encryption
mechanism of the mobile network [8,9]. This leaves the SMS gateway and the
SMS network itself as the only sources of such a threat, and routinely compro-
mising either the gateway or the SMS network for such a purpose seems unlikely
to be realistic in practice.
5.3 Threats to the PC
Exhausting the User’s SMS Credit. An adversary who has access to the
user’s PC but does not possess the user’s mobile phone could cause the system to
repeatedly send SMS messages, resulting in exhaustion of the user’s SIM credit
at the SMS gateway. This risk can be mitigated in the following ways.
1. If a user receives an unexpected SMS containing an OTP, the user should
immediately change their password at the SMS gateway. This will deny the
adversary the ability to send any further SMS messages from the user’s PC.
2. The browser extension could implement a simple, client-based, lock-out mech-
anism using cookies. That is, if the correct OTP is not entered within three
attempts, the browser extension could write a persistent7 cookie to the client
7 Persistent cookies can survive across a number of sessions, including after exiting
the browser and/or after a machine reboot. Such cookies have an expiry date; if a
cookie expires it is deleted.
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PC which will cause the current attempt to log in to the RP to be terminated.
The browser extension would then generate a special lock-out OTP and send
it to the user’s mobile phone. The next time that the user attempts to log
in to the same domain, the browser extension (before invoking the CIdS)
would prompt the user to enter the lock-out OTP, and would only proceed
if the correct OTP is entered. Although this solution may help to discourage
an attacker, it is not foolproof since cookies could be manually deleted on
the client machine, and an attacker could arrange for OTP-bearing SMSs to
be sent to a large number of diﬀerent domains.
Disabling the Browser Extension. If the system is conﬁgured so that it is
possible to disable the OTP adaptor, then a knowledgeable intruder could defeat
the protection provided by the scheme. Therefore, a robust implementation of
the scheme proposed in section 3.2 must not allow an adversary to disable it.
That is, the system must be conﬁgured to oblige users to use CardSpace coupled
with the OTP adaptor.
Browser extensions can be enabled/disabled at will by anyone who has access
to a Windows user account. So an adversary with access to InfoCards could
simply disable the browser extension to cause CardSpace to operate normally.
It may be possible to remove this threat, at least partially, by installing the
browser extension so that administrator privileges are required to disable it, and
also persuading the PC owner to log in using a non-administrator account. It may
also be possible to make use of UAC8 (User Account Control), so that disabling
a browser extension causes Windows to prompt the user for an administrator
password.
Ultimately, it would be desirable to implement the scheme described in sec-
tion 3.2 as an integral part of CardSpace, thereby negating this threat. In such
a scenario, each InfoCard might be given a selectable ﬁeld to indicate whether
SMS-based authentication is required. A user could thus choose to SMS-protect
an important InfoCard by simply selecting the appropriate ﬁeld.
Exploiting CardSpace Backup Facilities. The CardSpace backup facilities
could be exploited to allow an InfoCard to be exported from one PC to another.
An attacker could, for example, export a personal card to a USB memory stick,
and then reload the card on his or her own PC in order to impersonate the card
owner. An exported card could also be transferred as an email attachment. This
risk could be mitigated using countermeasures similar to those discussed above.
6 Prototype Realisation
We next give details of a prototype implementation of the scheme. The proto-
type is coded in JavaScript, chosen because its wide adoption should simplify
the task of porting the prototype to a range of other browsers. It uses the Doc-
ument Object Model (DOM) to inspect and manipulate HTML pages and XML
8 http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc709691(WS.10).aspx#BKMK_S1
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documents. The JavaScript code is executed using a C#-driven browser helper
object (BHO), a DLL (Dynamic-Link Library) module designed as a plug-in for
IE. Once installed, the BHO attaches itself to IE, thus gaining access to the
current page’s DOM. Note that the scheme operates with both the CardSpace
and the Higgins9 identity selectors without any modiﬁcation.
6.1 User Registration
Prior to use, the prototype user must have accounts with a CardSpace RP and an
SMS gateway service provider, e.g. Clickatell (clickatell.com). The prototype
provides step-by-step instructions in order to assist the user in inserting their
mobile phone number and their SMS account login details (e.g. username and
password) into the plug-in source code.
6.2 Prototype Operation
In this section we consider speciﬁc operational aspects of the prototype. We
refer throughout to the numbered protocol steps given in section 3.2 (see also
ﬁgure 2).
In step 3 the plug-in uses the DOM to perform the following processes.
3.1 It scans the web page in the following way10.
(a) It searches through the HTML elements of the web page to detect
whether any HTML forms are present. If so, it searches each form, scan-
ning through each of its child elements for an HTML object tag.
(b) If an object tag is found, it retrieves and examines its type. If it is of
type ‘application/x-informationCard’ (which indicates website support
for CardSpace), it continues; otherwise it aborts.
(c) It retrieves and stores in a cookie the name attribute of the CardSpace
object tag. This is important since the RP server will use this name to
retrieve the token from the HTTP POST array.
3.2 It embeds a JavaScript function in the head section of the HTML page to
intercept the RSTR.
3.3 It obtains the action attribute of the CardSpace HTML form and stores it
in a cookie. This attribute speciﬁes the URL of the CardSpace RP server to
which the RSTR must be forwarded for processing. If the attribute is not a
fully qualiﬁed domain name address, the JavaScript inherent properties, e.g.
document.location.protocol and/or document.location.host, are used to help
reconstruct the full URL address.
3.4 It changes the current action attribute of the CardSpace HTML form to
point to the newly created ‘interception’ function (see step 3.2 above).
9 http://wiki.eclipse.org/GTK_Selector_1.1-Win
10 The CardSpace user guide [6] specifies two HTML extension formats that can be used
to invoke the CIdS from a web page, both of which involve placing the CardSpace
object tag inside an HTML form. This motivates the choice of the web page search
method (see also [4,10]).
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In step 8 the plug-in uses the DOM to perform the following steps.
8.1 It intercepts the RSTR sent by the CIdS using the added function.
8.2 It generates a 4-character, random OTP (see section 4.1). It also starts a
10-minute time counter.
8.3 It builds an HTTPS-based URL, inserting the user’s mobile phone number,
the user’s account login details, and the OTP.
8.4 It automatically invokes the URL in a new, small browser window. This
process will cause the OTP to be sent to the SMS gateway via a secure
TLS/SSL channel. On receipt of the OTP, the SMS gateway delivers it to
the user’s mobile phone in an SMS message.
8.5 It prompts the user to enter the OTP, using a JavaScript pop-up box.
8.6 It veriﬁes the user-entered OTP by comparing it with the version it previ-
ously generated (in step 8.2), ensuring that the OTP has been entered within
the 10-minute time window. If the veriﬁcation succeeds it proceeds to the
next step. If the veriﬁcation fails, the user is allowed to try again. However,
if the veriﬁcation fails for three successive OTP entry attempts, the plug-in
terminates the login process and writes a persistent cookie to prevent the
user from logging into this RP using the same browser for a deﬁned time
period, e.g. 24 hours. This process operates as follows.
On the ﬁrst occasion that the system is used with a particular RP, or if the
previously written cookie has expired and been deleted, the plug-in writes
a persistent cookie containing the number of failed OTP entry attempts for
this RP (i.e. either zero if the attempt is successful or one if the attempt fails)
and with a lifetime of 24 hours. Whenever the system is used subsequently
the presence of this cookie is checked; if it is present then the current number
of failed OTP entry attempts it records is checked — if it is equal to three
then no SMS is sent and the RSTR is blocked, i.e. the system is locked
out and can only be unlocked if the user enters the special lockout OTP.
If it is less than three then the system proceeds. If the OTP entry attempt
succeeds then a new cookie is written containing the value zero; if the OTP
entry attempt fails, then a new cookie is written containing a value one larger
than the previous value.
8.7 It creates an ‘invisible’ HTML form with method attribute set to ‘POST’.
8.8 It writes the entire RSTR message into the invisible HTML form as a hidden
variable, with the name attribute of this variable set to the CardSpace object
tag’s name (see step 3.1.c).
8.9 It writes the end-point URL of the CardSpace-enabled RP into the action
attribute of the invisible form (see step 3.3).
8.10 Finally, it auto-submits the HTML form (transparently to the user), using
the JavaScript inherent method ‘submit’.
6.3 Practical Issues
The plug-in must scan every HTML web page to check whether it supports
CardSpace, and this may aﬀect system performance. However, informal tests on
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the prototype suggest that this is not a serious issue. In addition, the plug-in
can be conﬁgured so that it only operates with certain websites.
If the web browser is compromised, then an adversary could steal the RSTR
and the OTP, block the user-RP connection, and submit the token, thus im-
personating the user. If the RP does not use https, then the RSTR will not be
encrypted. Assuming that the web browser is not a secure environment, then it
may be possible for a malicious plug-in or some other type of malware to get
access to sensitive information disclosed by the plaintext RSTR. However, the
same risks apply when manually entering credentials (e.g. username-password)
into the browser [11].
Finally note that some older browsers (or browsers with scripting disabled)
may not be able to run the prototype plug-in, as it was built using JavaScript.
However, most modern browsers support JavaScript (or ECMAscript), and hence
building the prototype in JavaScript is not a major usability obstacle.
7 Related Work
Using a mobile device as a means of user authentication is attractive because
of the ubiquity of mobile phones, and many such schemes have been proposed.
Examples of schemes in which a mobile phone is used to authenticate a user to
a remote server include the following.
– Hart et al. [11] proposed a scheme in which user credentials (i.e. username
and password) are stored in a Java-enabled SIM card. When the user visits
a website, the browser extension requests the site’s user credentials from an
SMS gateway, which then sends a specially formatted SMS message to the
appropriate SIM card. The SIM card responds with another SMS message
containing the requested credentials, and the SMS gateway forwards them
to the browser extension via an HTTPS channel. The browser extension
then auto-submits them to the visited site. The scheme requires the user to
possess a SIM capable of hosting an application, and for the user to load an
appropriate application into it. It also has an SMS messaging cost at least
twice that of the scheme described in this paper.
– Wu et al. [12] and Jammalamadaka et al. [13] proposed schemes involving a
combination of a third party proxy, which stores the user credentials, and a
mobile phone. The schemes are designed for use in cases where an untrusted
PC, e.g. in an Internet kiosk, is used to access a remote website, and they
avoid the need for the user to enter long-term secret credentials into such
a PC (see also [14]). The phone is used to explicitly authorise the proxy to
release the credentials to the remote website. Unfortunately, not only is the
use of a proxy a potential security and reliability threat, but the PC must be
conﬁgured to use the proxy. This latter requirement is not only potentially
inconvenient, but in some cases may be impossible to meet since the user
may not have the necessary permissions to change the browser settings.
– Floreˆncio and Herley proposed ‘URRSA’ [15], an OTP-enhanced service
(based on a reverse proxy [16]) that allows users to access password-protected
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websites. The URRSA service does not require changes to login servers. A
list of 10 diﬀerent encrypted copies of a long-term user password (eﬀectively
OTPs) is generated and sent to the user’s mobile phone using SMS; the cor-
responding decryption keys are stored at the URRSA server. A user wishing
to access a protected site ﬁrst navigates to the URRSA site and enters the
URL and userID of the account to be accessed. The user then enters the ap-
propriate OTP from the current list, allowing the URRSA server to decrypt
and temporarily store the real password. The URRSA server then fetches the
previously registered login page and prompts the user to click the submit
button; the login process then proceeds. The user process for this scheme is
relatively complex, and new lists will need to be downloaded fairly frequently,
increasing the burden on the user.
– Aloul et al. [17] proposed a system that involves using a PIN-protected mo-
bile phone as a token for OTP generation. Additionally, an SMS-based mech-
anism is implemented as both a backup mechanism for retrieving the OTP
and as a possible means of client-server synchronisation. This method re-
quires both the client and server to pay to send SMS messages. Unlike the
scheme described here, the mobile phone must be J2ME-enabled, and, prior
to use, the user must install a special application in the phone.
– Mannan et al. [18] and Alqattan et al. [19] proposed similar schemes in which
the entry of user authentication credentials is accomplished using a trusted
handheld device, e.g. a PIN-protected mobile phone. For instance, in the
‘MP-Auth’ scheme [18], the mobile device encrypts the password using the
end server’s public key before passing it via an untrusted machine to the
remote server. However, unlike the scheme described in this paper, these
schemes require changes to login servers and also require users to possess
J2ME-enabled mobile phones.
– Schuba et al. [20] proposed the ‘Internet ID’ approach, in which a mobile
phone is used to provide user authentication to a Liberty IdP. We outline the
variant most similar to the scheme described above. A Liberty IdP generates
a random sequence of symbols, and sends them to the user’s mobile phone
in an SMS message. Simultaneously, these symbols are shown on the PC
browser, and the user is required to conﬁrm to the phone that the browser-
displayed symbols are the same as those in the SMS message, e.g. by clicking
a link on the WAP page on the mobile phone. Although this system does not
require the user to type anything, it does require changes to the operation
of Liberty IdPs.
– Jørstad et al. [21] proposed a scheme which supports interoperation between
CardSpace and Liberty. It uses a mobile phone for user authentication to
the IdP; the IdP sends an SMS message to the user, and, in order to be
authenticated, the user must conﬁrm receipt of the message. Much like the
‘Internet ID’ approach [20], this method requires changes to the operation
of the IdP.
Examples of schemes in which a mobile phone is used to authenticate the user
to a local PC include the following.
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– Lach [1] proposed ‘MOTH’, a scheme in which a workstation and a mobile
device communicate using Bluetooth, and authentication is realised using
digital signatures. Unlike in our scheme, the mobile device in the MOTH
system must be able to run Java midlets. To avoid an attacker bypassing the
scheme, a MOTH-conformant PC must be conﬁgured to only use the MOTH
service for authentication, and not to fall back to password authentication.
Similarly, the scheme described in this paper must be conﬁgured to oblige
the use of the adaptor with CardSpace (see section 5.3). In MOTH, binding
a user to a public key remains a challenge.
– Abdulhameed et al. [22] proposed a method which uses a Bluetooth-enabled
mobile phone. The user’s PC communicates with the phone via a Bluetooth
link, and public key cryptographic techniques are used to provide mutual
authentication between the PC and the phone. The PC periodically senses
the phone to ensure that the user is still present; if the mobile phone moves
out of range, the PC is conﬁgured to take certain measures to raise the se-
curity level. It is unclear from the paper whether this form of authentication
could be disabled by an attacker so that the PC reverts to password-based
user authentication, a possible means of circumventing the scheme. Not only
must the mobile phone be Bluetooth-enabled, but it must also support Java
to provide certain cryptographic and authentication services.
Finally note that the scheme proposed in this paper falls somewhere in between
the two classes described above, in that it provides authentication to a local PC
in such a way that it enables authentication to a remote site to continue in a
more secure way.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we have proposed a simple and novel scheme for using a mobile
device to enhance CardSpace authentication. During the process of user authen-
tication on a PC using CardSpace, a random and short-lived one-time password
is sent to the mobile device; this must then be entered into the PC by the user.
The scheme does not require any changes to login servers, the CardSpace identity
selector, or to the mobile device itself. We have given details of a proof-of-concept
prototype. Security and operational analyses have also been provided.
Planned future work includes exploring the possibility of extending the scheme
to operate with other client-enabled identity management systems, including
password managers. We also plan to develop the prototype in various ways,
including:
– preventing it being disabled by an unauthorised PC user;
– providing support for OTP transfer to the mobile via Bluetooth and/or
infrared; and
– supporting automated OTP entry from the mobile.
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